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1 Introduction
There exists a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the e¤ects of climate change and the possibility
that this climate change could at any point trigger a weather-related catastrophe. A climate change
catastrophe can be viewed as a low-probability high-impact event that causes wide-scale damage.
Extreme weather-related events such as hurricanes, wildres, storms and ooding are increasingly
being attributed to climate change and are becoming a public policy concern. Consider the case of
Dawlish, a small village in the county of Devon, UK. In February 2014, parts of southern Britain
were hit by a severe storm, that led to the collapse of a section of the sea wall in Dawlish and left
the railway to Cornwall suspended in mid-air. The storm also a¤ected residents in nearby Somerset,
who were evacuated amid fears that ood defences could be overwhelmed. The government at the
time pledged an extra £ 100m for ood works and set up a "Flood Grants Scheme" to provide grants
for homeowners in England a¤ected in the future. Similar levels of damage have been caused more
recently by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria, with liabilities amounting to several billions of
dollars in aid and restoration work.
The aid received by victims of these events though very welcome, seldom covers their liabilities
completely. Given the uncertainty surrounding a catastrophic event taking place, it would be inter-
esting to investigate whether people are su¢ ciently concerned in order to insure themselves against
extreme weather events. Moreover, if given the opportunity to protect themselves against such a
catastrophe, do individuals insure themselves?
This paper combines experimental and theoretical research to study the e¤ect of uncertainty on
individualscontribution decisions towards a climate change "insurance", that would mitigate and/or
pool and transfer the risks of climate change related events. Consider a small community that must
build sea/river defences to protect itself from ooding. The community begins an initiative to gather
funds to build a dyke, which will only be built if a certain threshold of contributions is reached. The
dyke, if built, protects everyone equally irrespective of personal contributions. A threshold public
goods game thus arises, where a minimum amount of contributions needs to be raised for provision
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to occur. In this example, the climate change "insurance" contributions are being used to adapt and
mitigate the e¤ects of a climate change catastrophe directly.
More indirectly, contributing to the insurance could be seen as a method of pooling and transfer
of risks, such that if a catastrophe occurred, any losses su¤ered would be nancially compensated. A
contribution threshold would need to be reached in order to make it viable for an insurance company
to provide cover. With this in mind, a threshold public goods game is used to model individuals
contribution decisions towards the group insurance. If the threshold contribution level is reached,
the insurance is purchased and would nancially compensate victims against losses su¤ered due to
an extreme weather event.
If it is found that individuals fail to safeguard themselves (i.e., the threshold is not reached), it
might indicate that a very low probability is attached to such an event. It might be that giving
subjects information about the increasing frequency of such events, could help in improving con-
tributions. This would test whether better access to information results in increased subscriptions.
Further, it would also provide a check against the emergence of a "lemons market"1. Private insurers
would be hesitant to provide insurance if only high-risk individuals subscribed to their insurance,
which would result in market failure due to a missing market2.
In the event of a missing market, governments may decide that the provision of insurance cover
has many elements of a public good. State involvement in providing ood insurance to residential and
non-residential properties is already common, with many countries already putting public-private or
government-funded schemes in place. Further, it has been documented (See Winston & Woodbury
(1991)) that individuals discount the future to a great extent and fail to make su¢ cient provisions for
themselves. It would be interesting to investigate whether the State should intervene if individuals fail
to insure themselves against the risk of a climate change catastrophe. Could an indirect intervention
or "nudge" that changes the default contribution status overcome behavioural biases that result in
1The term is attributed to Akerlof (1970), who established that in the presence of assymetric information in a
market, the quality of goods traded on the market deteriorated, leaving only "lemons" or the bad kind of buyer/seller
behind in the market.
2A missing market is a situation that emerges when a competitive market allowing the exchange of a commodity
would be Pareto-e¢ cient, but no such market exists.
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people failing to optimally insure themselves?
The study nds that subjects respond in an averse manner to the uncertainty surrounding the
climate event, with 67% of subjects successfully purchasing the climate change insurance. When
subjects have more information about the growing frequency of such events, 79% successfully insure
themselves. This may give rise to a "lemons" problem, with only high-risk individuals/regions
subscribing towards climate change insurance and suggests that government intervention may be
required to ensure market failures do not arise. When the strategic uncertainty of coordinating with
another person is removed, 81% of subjects are successful in buying the insurance. An indirect
intervention in the form of a nudge was unsuccessful, with only 58% of subjects successfully buying
the insurance.
2 Related Literature
There is a growing body of economic studies on climate change. Stern (2006) is one of the most
signicant studies that analyses the market failures caused by climate change and proposes a range
of mechanisms including environmental taxes to minimise the economic and social disruptions caused
by climate change. McKibbin & Wilcoxen (2002) consider the role of economics in climate change
policy and suggest the use of a hybrid model that incorporates the best features of tradable permits
and emissions taxes.
A number of studies have been conducted that analyse permit trading in the context of climate
change (see Bohm & Carlen (2002), Cramtom & Kerr (2002), Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus (2006),
Wråke et al. (2008)), while the case for taxing green house gas emissions is considered by Metcalf
(2007), Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann (2009), Gerlagh et al. (2009) among others. There have also been
studies that consider the behavioral economics of climate change, in particular, the implications of
prospect theory, the equity premium puzzle and time inconsistent preferences in the choice of discount
rate used in climate change cost assessments (for a detailed analysis see Brekke & Johansson-Stenman
(2008)).
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Further, there have been studies that investigate individual behaviour regarding climate change
to determine whether communication (Milinski et al. (2008)), fairness and di¤erences in endowment
levels (Tavoni et al. (2011)), a¤ect how individuals coordinate to try and prevent climate change
catastrophes. Barrett & Dannenberg (2012) investigate whether uncertainty about climate change
a¤ects international cooperation, by modelling climate negotiations as a coordination game. Dannen-
berg et al. (2015) analyse whether uncertainty regarding the level of the threshold a¤ects collective
action in threshold public goods games.
Unlike the Dannenberg et al. (2015) study, subjects in the current study do not face uncertainty
regarding the level of the threshold. Subjects are aware of the threshold required to purchase the
insurance but face uncertainty because of the unknown probability with which a climate change
catastrophe may or may not occur (exogenous uncertainty) and uncertainty about the other subjects
choice of contribution levels (endogenous uncertainty).
Subjectscontribution decisions are modelled by a threshold public goods game. For an extensive
survey of the literature on public goods, see Ledyard (1995). Uncertainty in the standard public
goods model has been previously studied in Eichberger & Kelsey (2002) and Bailey et al. (2005).
Weakest-link/best-shot versions of the public good game with strategic uncertainty have been studied
by Kelsey & le Roux (2017). This study adds to the existing literature by analysing the e¤ect of
uncertainty in threshold public goods games.
3 Experimental Model and Equilibrium
Individualscontribution decisions are modelled using a threshold public goods game. Subjects who
take part in the game are given an endowment and informed that they might be the victim of a
climate change catastrophe. The catastrophe which occurs with some unknown probability,3 would
result in them losing their endowment. Subjects can safeguard themselves against such a loss, by
contributing as a team towards insurance. The insurance is bought if the threshold is reached and
3The probability distribution was pre-determined but the realisation outcome was randomly determined by z-Tree.
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safeguards the team as a whole in the event of a catastrophe taking place.
Each subjects contribution towards attaining the insurance may be viewed as a strategic substi-
tute for the otherscontributions. In the presence of uncertainty, if a player thinks that the others in
his group would not contribute towards the public good, it should prompt him to increase his own
contribution, in order to buy the insurance and avoid catastrophic climate change (Kelsey & le Roux
(2017)). It is thus possible to get a theoretical prediction of subject behaviour, given that there is a
clear worst case scenario failure to buy the insurance and a loss due to catastrophic climate change.
In line with Eichberger & Kelsey (2011), the introduction of uncertainty helps to better predict
behavior in the games considered than Nash equilibrium. A theoretical equilibrium under uncertainty
can be calculated such that a player optimises his/her contribution, based on his/her belief about one
other opponents contribution. Alternatively, a player may optimise against a number of opponents
whose contributions are taken as a group, such that the player then optimises his/her contribution
based on the belief about the groups total contribution.
For simplicity, the experimental setup in the current study makes use of two players, each given
an endowment of 30 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), who play ve rounds.4 In each round a
player could contribute between 0  4 ECU (discrete contributions) with the aim of getting a total
joint contribution of 20ECU at the end of the ve rounds. If at the end of the rounds, the players
managed to reach the 20ECU threshold, they safeguarded themselves against the harmful impact
of a climate change catastrophe. If they failed to reach the threshold, the players would lose their
endowment if a climate change catastrophe occurred.
Subjects were randomly matched into groups of two and remained in the same group throughout
the experiment. Subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other and no information
about intermediate contribution levels was made available between rounds. As such, subjects would
perceive uncertainty from two sources:
1) Uncertainty arising due to the unknown probability with which climate change catastrophe
4The problem may be viewed as a one-shot game but was planned to consist of ve rounds to reect that insurance
premiums are paid over a few periods rather than as a one-time lump sum payment.
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may or may not occur (exogenous uncertainty).
2) Strategic uncertainty arising from the interaction with other players, i.e., uncertainty about
the other subjects choice of contribution levels (endogenous uncertainty).
3.1 Nash equilibrium
In a Nash equilibrium, players are believed to behave in a manner that is consistent with the actual
behaviour of their opponents. They predict the actions of their opponent with perfect accuracy and
can thus provide a best response to it in the form of their own action.
The probability with which the catastrophe would occur was determined by a random generator
on z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)), such that the catastrophe occurred with a maximum probability of
80%. The Nash equilibria for the game are discussed below.
Proposition 3.1 The threshold public goods game has two symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria:
1. Where each player contributes nothing each round and they fail to reach the threshold;
2. Where each player contributes a total of 10ECU over the ve rounds and the safety threshold
is reached.
Given the (maximum) probability with which the catastrophe may occur, the expected payo¤
when no contributions are made towards the insurance is: (0:8  0) + (0:2  30) = 6ECU; i.e., 80% of
the time the catastrophe occurs and the subjects lose their entire endowment, while 20% of the time
the catastrophe does not occur and the subjects keep their initial endowment. When each player
contributes a total of 10ECU over the ve rounds, the safety threshold is reached and each player
has a guaranteed nal payo¤ of 20ECU:
For lower probabilities of a catastrophe ( < 1
3
), the strategy combination in which everyone
contributes 10ECU is no longer a Nash equilibrium, but given the probability with which the random
generator may determine that the catastrophe occurs, it is optimal for each player to contribute
10ECU over the ve decision rounds, which makes this the more e¢ cient symmetric equilibrium
strategy.
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Proposition 3.2 The threshold public goods game has multiple asymmetric Nash equilibria, where
any combination of contributions from the two players which is equal to the threshold level of 20ECU
is a Nash equilibrium.
In essence, there is no di¤erence between the e¢ cient symmetric equilibrium and the asymmet-
ric equilibria. However, both contributing more and contributing less than necessary to reach the
threshold, is ine¢ cient.
3.2 Equilibrium under Uncertainty
In the presence of uncertainty, the Nash equilibrium concept of accurately predicting the opponents
behaviour is no longer valid and needs to be modied. Unlike Nash equilibrium where a player can
assign an additive probability distribution to his opponents actions, in the presence of uncertainty,
the beliefs of a player are represented by a neo-additive capacities. Neo-additive capacities were
introduced by Chateauneuf et al. (2007), as a way of capturing non-additive probabilities. In this
model the decision-maker has beliefs based on an additive probability distribution : However the
decision-maker lacks condence in these beliefs, which are thus uncertain beliefs. The endogenous
uncertainty the decision-maker faces in a given situation is represented by the parameter : The
individuals attitude to exogenous uncertainty is represented by the parameter ; with higher values
of  corresponding to the belief that the catastrophe is more likely to take place.
Schmeidler (1989) proposed a theory called Choquet Expected Utility (CEU), where outcomes
are evaluated by a weighted sum of utilities, but unlike Expected Utility Theory the weights used
depend on the acts. Applying the model of decision-making under uncertainty to the two-player
game being studied in this paper: If xi is the action chosen by Player 1 from the set that contains
all her strategies: Xi; and x i denotes the action chosen by her opponent (Player 2) from the set
that contains all his strategies: X i , the payo¤ function measuring the CEU of Player 1 may be
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represented as:5
Vi(xi;i; i; i) = i

i min
x i2X i
ui(xi; x i) + (1  i) max
x i2X i
ui(xi; x i)

+ (1  i)Eiui(xi; x i);
where Eiui(xi; x i) is a conventional expectation taken with respect to the additive probability
distribution  on X i:
The CEU of a player maximises a weighted average of the best payo¤, the worst payo¤ and the
expected payo¤. Intuitively,  can be thought to be the decision-makers belief about the opponents
action. However, this is an uncertain belief. Her reaction to this endogenous uncertainty is modelled
by (1 i); with i = 1 denoting complete ignorance about the opponents behaviour (or contribution
level) and i = 0 denoting complete certainty about the opponents behaviour. Her attitude to
exogenous uncertainty (regarding the climate event) is measured by i; with i = 1 denoting pure
pessimism with respect to the climate change event taking place and i = 0 denoting pure optimism
about the chances of the catastrophic event taking place. If the decision-maker has 0 < i < 1; she
is neither purely optimistic nor purely pessimistic (i.e., uncertainty-averse), but reacts to exogenous
uncertainty in a partly pessimistic way by putting a weight on bad outcomes and in a partly optimistic
way by putting a weight on good outcomes.
Proposition 3.3 The game has the following symmetric Equilibrium under Uncertainty:
1. If Player i believes that Player  i might contribute 0ECU and has beliefs such that i(1 i) < 13
and ii > 23 ; she should contribute 20ECU towards the insurance;
2. If Player i believes that Player  i might contribute 10ECU and has beliefs such that i(1 i) <
1
2
< ii; she should contribute 20ECU towards the insurance.
Proof.
Part 1. If Player 1 believes that Player 2 will contribute nothing (0ECU), she has two
options - she can either contribute nothing herself or she can contribute 20ECU to ensure that the
5We use the convention that female pronouns denote Player 1 and male pronouns denote Player 2. Of course this
convention is for convenience only and bears no relation to the actual gender of subjects in the experiments.
8
threshold is reached and she gets a guaranteed payo¤ of V^1 = 10. If she too contributes nothing, the
maximum payo¤ she can earn is 30ECU; if the climate event does not occur; else, if the catastrophe
occurs her payo¤ is 0ECU: If 1 and 1 reect Player 1s endogenous and exogenous ambiguity
parameters respectively and 2 is the probability with which Player 2 contributes 0ECU , Player 1s
CEU from contributing nothing will be:
V 1 = 1 [1  0 + (1  1)  30] + (1  1)(30  2)
= 301(1  1) + 30(1  1)2:
Player 1 will prefer to contribute 20ECU i¤:
V 1 < 10
301(1  1) + 30(1  1)2 < 10
1(1  1) + (1  1)2 <
1
3
:
Based on Player 1s belief of 2; V^1 is strictly preferred i¤: 1(1   1) < 13 and 11 > 23 : Thus, if
Player 1 is su¢ ciently uncertain she should contribute 20ECU , in order to ensure that the threshold
is reached.
Similarly, let the probability with which Player 1 contributes 0ECU be 1; while 2 and 2
reect Player 2s endogenous and exogenous ambiguity parameters respectively: Player 2 should also
contribute 20ECU , if he is su¢ ciently uncertain about the safety threshold being reached, i.e., if
2(1  2) < 13 and 22 > 23
Part 2. Let the probability with which Player 2 contributes 10ECU be ~2; while 1 and
1 reect Player 1s endogenous and exogenous ambiguity parameters respectively: If Player 1 con-
tributes 10ECU : The maximum payo¤, if the threshold is reached, is 20ECU . Else, if the threshold
is not reached and the climate change catastrophe occurs, the payo¤ is 0ECU: The CEU of Player
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1 from contributing 10ECU can be computed as:
~V1 = 1 [1  0 + (1  1)  20] + (1  1)(20  ~2)
= 201(1  1) + 20(1  1)~2:
Alternatively, if Player 1 contributes 20ECU the threshold is always reached and she has a secure
payo¤ of 10ECU: The CEU of Player 1 from contributing 20ECU is thus: V^1 = 10: Player 1 will
prefer to contribute 20ECU i¤:
~V1 < 10
201(1  1) + 20(1  1)~2 < 10
1(1  1) + (1  1)~2 < 1
2
:
Based on Player 1s belief of ~2; V^1 is strictly preferred i¤: 1(1 1) < 12 < 11: Thus, if Player 1 is
su¢ ciently uncertain she should contribute 20ECU , in order to ensure that the threshold is reached.
Similarly, let the probability with which Player 1 contributes 10ECU be ~1; while 2 and 2
reect Player 2s endogenous and exogenous ambiguity parameters respectively: Player 2 should also
contribute 20ECU , if he is su¢ ciently uncertain about the safety threshold being reached, i.e., if
2(1  2) < 12 < 22:
Proposition 3.4 The game has the following asymmetric Equilibrium under Uncertainty: If Player
i believes that Player  i might contribute x iECU where x i 2 [0; 20] and has beliefs such that
i(1  i) < 1010+x i and ii >
x i
10+x i
; she should contribute 20ECU towards the insurance.
Proof. With uncertainty, if Player 1 expects her opponent to contribute x2ECU towards the
insurance with probability 2; where x2 2 [0; 20]; then she should contribute (20  x2)ECU in order
to reach the threshold. The maximum payo¤ she would expect in this scenario is (10 + x2)ECU if
the threshold is reached. The minimum payo¤ if the threshold is not reached and the event occurs
is 0ECU: The CEU for Player 1 can be computed as:
10
V1 = 1 [1  0 + (1  1)  (10 + x2)] + (1  1)(10 + x2)  2
= 1(1  1)(10 + x2) + (1  1)(10 + x2)~2:
Player 1 will prefer to contribute 20ECU and get the resultant guaranteed payo¤ of V^1 = 10; i¤:
V1 < 10
1(1  1)(10 + x2) + (1  1)(10 + x2)~2 < 10:
Based on Player 1s belief of ~2; V^1 is strictly preferred if: 1(1  1) < 1010+x2 and 11 > x210+x2 :
The equilibrium under uncertainty for Player 2 is symmetric to that of Player 1. If the probability
with which Player 1 contributes x1ECU is 1; where x1 2 [0; 20]; while 2 and 2 reect Player
2s endogenous and exogenous ambiguity parameters respectively: Player 2 should also contribute
20ECU , if he is su¢ ciently uncertain about the safety threshold being reached, i.e., if 2(1  2) <
10
10+x1
and 22 > x110+x1 :
The testable hypothesis that arises from this discussion is that while Nash equilibrium predicts
that subjects should contribute either 0ECU or 10ECU , equilibrium under uncertainty suggests
that subjects who are uncertainty-averse would contribute greater than 10ECU in total, in order to
ensure that the safety threshold is reached.
4 Experimental Design
The experiment was coded using z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)) and was "framed", explicitly
mentioning a climate change catastrophe. However, the ndings would also be applicable to any
other low-probability high-impact event that was not weather related.
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Finance and Economics Experimental Labora-
tory in Exeter (FEELE), UK between October 2015 and May 2016. A total of 719 subjects took part
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in the experiments, 319 of whom were male and the remaining 400 were female. The breakdown of
subjects between treatments were as follows: Treatment I - 180 subjects, Treatment II - 192 subjects,
Treatment III - 153 subjects and Treatment IV - 194 subjects. Each session lasted a maximum of 45
minutes including payment.
The experiment could have been run as a one-shot game, but was planned to consist of ve rounds
to reect that insurance premiums are paid over a few periods rather than as a one-time lump sum
payment. Subjects could not communicate with each other during the experiment and received no
information about their team members contribution decisions between rounds - therefore, there was
no opportunity to update beliefs.
Subjects rst read through a short, comprehensive set of instructions at their own pace.6 The
subjects were then asked to ll out practice questions to check that they understood the game
correctly. Subjects could not proceed to the main experiment until they had correctly answered
the practice questions. As such, if subjects were unable to answer a question correctly, they were
assisted and their doubt/query resolved before they proceeded to take part in the main experiment.
The provision threshold was common knowledge among the participants. Four treatments were
employed as under:
Treatment I (base treatment) - Subjects were randomly assigned to teams of two and remained
in the same team throughout the experiment. Each member was given an endowment of 30ECU
and played 5 rounds as part of the experiment. Subjects were informed that the climate change
catastrophe might occur with some unknown probability. If the catastrophe occurred, both team
members would lose all their money. They could protect their team against such a loss, if they
decided to purchase a Climate Change Insurance Policy. In each round, a subject could contribute
between 0-4 ECU from his/her endowment to a team "pot". The insurance was purchased if the pot
contained at least 20 ECU at the end of the 5 rounds.
The base treatment was designed to analyse whether individuals were su¢ ciently concerned by
6The experimental protocols are available in the Appendix.
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climate change catastrophes in order to successfully insure themselves. All subsequent treatments
were variations of Treatment I as below:
Treatment II (information treatment) - In this treatment, subjects were informed that in the
past few periods, climate change catastrophes were known to have struck at least 80% of the time.
Subjects were thus given additional information about the probability with which catastrophes had
occurred in the experimental sessions that had already been conducted. It is important to note
here that the probability with which the catastrophic event takes place in the current period is an
independent event, whose probability is still uncertain. The frequency with which a ood/storm has
impacted an area, makes it more likely that it might happen again, but does not guarantee the event
occurring each period. The individuals attitude to exogenous uncertainty (regarding the climate
event) is represented by the parameter i; with higher values of i corresponding to the belief that
the catastrophe is more likely to take place. As such, i = 1 would denote pure pessimism with
respect to the climate event i.e., a belief that the event will denitely take place, while i = 0 would
denote pure optimism about the chances of the catastrophic event taking place i.e., a belief that the
event will denitely not take place. When given the additional information about the likelihood of
the event taking place, individuals would update their prior belief i, to a new belief 
0
i; that takes
into account the additional information. The aim of this treatment is to check whether information
about the increased frequency of weather-related catastrophes leads to an increase in the insurance
contributions and to check for the emergence of a lemons market where a lot of (self-perceived)
high-risk types buy the insurance.
Treatment III (computer treatment) - Participants in this treatment are matched with a computer,
analogous to Bohnet et al. (2008) who consider a trust game/risky dictator game rather than a
threshold public goods game with uncertainty. Subjects were informed that they had been assigned
to a team, where a computer programmed to contribute 2ECU=round, was the other player, and
that they should not expect the computer to deviate from this strategy. Participants who are
matched against a computer would not face the strategic (endogenous) uncertainty of coordinating
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with another player. This treatment therefore strictly captures the reaction to exogenous uncertainty
regarding the climate change event. Player 2 (the computer) always contributes 10ECU; therefore,
Player 1 should either contribute 0ECU or 10ECU: If Player 1 contributes 10ECU , she has a secure
payo¤ of 20ECU (since the computer is assured to pay the balance required to reach the threshold):
If Player 1 contributes 0ECU; her expected payo¤ is:
V1 = [1  0 + (1  1)  30]
V1 = (1  1)  30;
with higher values of 1 corresponding to the belief that the catastrophe is more likely to take place.
Player 1 would strictly prefer to contribute 10ECU i¤: (1   1)  30 < 20 or 1 > 13 : Thus in
Treatment III, Player 1 should either contribute 0ECU if 1 < 13 ; or 10ECU if 1 >
1
3
: At 1 = 13 ;
she is indi¤erent between purchasing the insurance or not purchasing it.
Treatment IV (nudge treatment) - This treatment was designed to simulate an indirect policy
intervention or nudge, such that subjects were automatically enrolled to a pre-assigned contribution
level of 2ECU 7 per round. If subjects were dissatised with this automatic assignment, they needed
to take conscious (and concrete) steps to opt o¤ it. Subjects could not opt-o¤ as a result of a tremble,
but could do so by solving a simple mathematics question correctly in order to deviate from the pre-
assigned selection. Similarly, subjects who wanted to deviate from the pre-assigned contribution
levels to increase their contributions also had to perform the simple task, in order to ensure that
the deviation was not a tremble/mistake, but consciously determined. This is consistent with the
real world, where individuals who want to make higher rate contributions (towards a pension or
insurance) need to be proactive in order to sign up to the higher rate.
Once subjects had made all the decisions, the result screen informed subjects about how much
7The pre-assigned contribution level, is the contribution level predicted by the e¢ cient symmetric Nash equilibrium
(also the Nash that would be consistent with fairness constraints).
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the group contribution towards the insurance had been and whether the insurance had been pur-
chased. There was no reimbursement of contributions if the threshold was not reached or if surplus
contributions were made. The computer used a random algorithm to simulate whether the climate
change catastrophe had occurred (or not), and calculated the nal payo¤ in ECU and GBP , for each
subject. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of $3, together with their earnings, where 5ECU = $1:8
Average payo¤s per treatments were as follows: Treatment I - $5:50, Treatment II - $6, Treatment
III - $6:40 and Treatment IV - $5:50:9
5 Data Analysis and Discussion
The experiment consisted of ve rounds to reect that insurance premiums are paid over a few periods
rather than as a one-time lump sum payment. The total amount paid by the subject towards the
insurance (over the ve rounds) is used to classify their behaviour (See Table 1). Subjects contributing
less than 10ECU form Group A, subjects contributing exactly 10ECU (or the contribution level
predicted by the e¢ cient symmetric Nash) fall in Group B, and subjects contributing more than
10ECU (or those conforming with the equilibrium under uncertainty prediction) fall in Group C.
Only 19 (2:64%) out of the total 719 subjects that took part in the experiments contributed nothing
towards buying the insurance (i.e., 0ECU in each round). It was found that there were only 2 (0:28%)
subjects who were consistent with the equilibrium under uncertainty prediction and contributed
20ECU towards the insurance.10
Observed subject behaviour in the experiments, on the whole, suggested that subjects were indeed
concerned about the losses that could be caused by a climate change catastrophe. Table 2 shows
the number of groups that successfully reached the required threshold and safeguarded themselves
against the climate change catastrophe. Binomial tests were run to ascertain whether the number of
groups reaching the threshold in each treatment was signicantly more than the number of groups
8Participantsshow-up fee was not a¤ected by the climate change catastrophe.
9Payo¤s were rounded up to the nearest 20p; for the purpose of payment.
10Only two subjects contributed 20ECU : one played in Treatment I and the other in Treatment IV.
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that failed to reach the threshold. Table 3 shows that null was rejected at a 1% signicance level
overall and for Treatments I, II and III, and at a 5% signicance level for Treatment IV.
In Treatment I (the base treatment), two-thirds of the groups (60 groups) successfully purchased
the insurance. This indicates that subjects are indeed concerned about climate change catastrophes
and their impact. When given the opportunity to insure themselves, subjects tend to do so. From
Table 1, it can be noted that approximately 21% of subjects (Group A) either tried to coordinate
asymmetrically or were happy to free-ride on others contributions; 52% of subjects (Group B)
attempted to coordinate in order to achieve the e¢ cient symmetric Nash and 26% (Group C) made
contributions that were consistent with the equilibrium under uncertainty. It is clear that a majority
of subjects conform to the symmetric Nash equilibrium, however, a signicant number of subjects
contribute more than predicted by Nash. Another factor that could be a¤ecting the decision of
subjects that fall in Group C (in Treatment I), may be weak altruism (Wilson (1990)), such that
subjects willingly bear the burden of purchasing the insurance on their own, in order to safeguard
the team as a whole.
Since there was no reimbursement of contributions, contributing both more and less than neces-
sary to reach the threshold is ine¢ cient. Table 4 summarises the number of groups who contributed
ine¢ ciently. It can be noted that in Treatment I, about 66.67% of groups made ine¢ cient contribu-
tions towards the insurance.
Table 1: Individual Contribution Levels
Subjects Group A Group B Group C
Cont. <10ECU Cont. =10ECU Cont. >10ECU
Treatment I n=180 38 21.11% 94 52.22% 48 26.67%
Treatment II n=192 24 12.50% 105 54.69% 63 32.81%
Treatment III n=153 29 18.95% 97 63.40% 27 17.65%
Treatment IV n=194 53 27.32% 96 49.48% 45 23.20%
Overall 144 20.03% 392 54.52% 183 25.45%
In Treatment II (information treatment), subjects were found to take the additional information
on board and this resulted in an increase in the number of groups that successfully purchased the
16
Table 2: Success in buying the Climate Change Insurance
Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III Treatment IV
Number of groups 90 96 153 97
Groups reaching threshold 60 76 124 57
Groups not reaching threshold 30 20 29 40
% of successful groups 66.67% 79.17% 81.05% 58.76%
Table 3: Binomial Test Results
Null Hypothesis (H0): prob(threshold reached) = prob(threshold not reached)
Alt. Hypothesis (H1): prob(threshold reached) > prob(threshold not reached)
Treatment I 3.1623***
Treatment II 5.7155***
Treatment III 7.6803***
Treatment IV 1.7261**
Overall 9.4825***
*, **, *** indicate signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
insurance to 79:17% (76 groups). A Fisher exact test11 shows that there is a signicant increase in the
number of groups purchasing the insurance, when compared to the base treatment (P = 0:069): This
indicates that if individuals are given access to information that shows that the frequency of climate
change catastrophes in their area is increasing, they would update their beliefs and insure more often.
Theoretically, if the information revealed that the frequency of climate change catastrophes in their
area is decreasing/low, it would reduce the number of insurance subscriptions. However, this might
lead to a lemons problem emerging in the climate change insurance market, such that only high-risk
customers are insured. Private insurers would not be willing/able to pool risks e¢ ciently in such a
scenario. Asymmetric subscriptions may result in the need for government intervention, in order to
improve the market outcome. In terms of e¢ ciency, Treatment II does not di¤er much from the base
treatment (See Table 4). About 66.67% of groups made ine¢ cient contributions, with a majority of
the groups over-contributing towards the insurance.
In Treatment III (computer treatment), 81:05% (124 subjects) successfully reached the required
threshold - i.e., when the strategic uncertainty of coordination was removed, the number of subjects
purchasing the insurance increases. When compared to the base treatment, a Fisher exact test12
11(H0: The proportion of groups buying insurance in Treatment I and II are identical, H1: The proportion of groups
buying insurance in Treatment II is greater than in Treatment I.)
12(H0: The proportion of groups buying insurance in Treatment I and III are identical, H1: The proportion of
groups buying insurance in Treatment III is greater than in Treatment I.)
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Table 4: E¢ ciency Analysis
Cont. < 20ECU Cont. > 20ECU Total Ine¤. Groups Total Groups Ine¢ ciency Rate
Treatment I 30 30 60 90 66.67%
Treatment II 20 44 64 96 66.67%
Treatment III 29 27 56 153 36.60%
Treatment IV 40 29 69 97 71.13%
Overall 119 130 249 436 57.11%
shows that there is a signicant increase in the number of subjects purchasing the insurance in
Treatment III (P = 0:014): Under Treatment III, if subjects are not concerned about the climate
change catastrophe (i.e., if they have an i < 13), they should contribute 0ECU: The data for this
treatment, nds that 6 subjects contributed 0ECU towards the insurance, indicating that this small
minority (3:92%) of subjects did not nd the catastrophe a matter of concern. In this treatment,
it is irrational to contribute both more and less than 10ECU , since the computer is guaranteed
to contribute the remaining. There were 27 subjects who contributed more than 10ECU and 23
subjects who made a positive contribution (i.e., greater than 0ECU) but not enough to reach the
threshold. Overall, this was the most e¢ cient treatment.
In Treatment IV (nudge treatment) it was found that the number of groups successfully purchasing
the insurance (58:76% or 57 groups) was lower than in the base treatment. It is very interesting to
note that policy intervention/nudge seems to have backred - i.e., subjects exerted an e¤ort to opt-o¤
the pre-assigned contribution level. A Fisher exact test13 nds no di¤erence between Treatments I
and IV (P = 0:292), reecting that the nudge was not successful in a¤ecting peoples behaviour or
that it may have even caused a "rebellious" behaviour on the part of subjects. This is termed as a
"boomerang e¤ect" in psychology, where an attempt to persuade a subject, results in the unintended
consequence of him adopting an opposing position instead. The boomerang e¤ect phenomenon was
rst identied by Brehm & Brehm (1981) and has since been documented in other studies considering
individual behaviour in socio-economic situations (See Werch et al. (2000), Wechsler et al. (2003),
Perkins et al. (2005), Schultz et al. (2007), Allcott (2011)).
13(H0: The proportion of groups buying insurance in Treatment I and IV are identical, H1: The proportion of
groups buying insurance in Treatment IV is greater than in Treatment I.)
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In the current study, 53 (27%) subjects exerted the extra e¤ort required to reduce their contri-
bution level. Interestingly, 45 (23%) subjects exerted the extra e¤ort required in order to increase
their contribution levels. These subjects display that they are willing to contribute more than the
standard State-required contribution level in order to avoid ambiguous losses. About 50% of the
subjects (96 subjects) remained at the "State-determined" pre-assigned contribution level. In terms
of e¢ ciency, Treatment IV was the most ine¢ cient treatment (See Table 4), with about 71.13%
of groups making ine¢ cient contributions - a bulk of these groups under-contributing towards the
insurance.
The standard Ellsberg (1961) urn question14 was posed to subjects, in order to determine their
attitude towards uncertainty. For an extensive survey of the literature on Ellsberg experiments, see
Trautmann & van de Kuilen (2016). In the current study, the Ellsberg urn question posed to the
subjects was not incentivised. For other papers that also assume that non-incentivised Ellsberg-style
thought experiments reveal true preferences see Butler et al. (2014) and Bianchi & Tallon (2016).
Cavatorta & Schröder (2016) conduct a comprehensive study that provides empirical support to
the assumption that unincetivised thought experiments are signicantly correlated to uncertainty
preferences that are obtained in incentivised decision tasks.
Dummy variables were dened for the various treatments (Treatment I, Treatment II, etc.) and to
capture subjectsattitude to uncertainty (Uncertainty-Averse/Seeking). A probit regression was run
to ascertain what factors increased the likelihood of the insurance being bought. Table 5 provides
the results of a probit regression of "Insurance Bought" on the various treatment and uncertainty-
attitude dummies. The dummy for Treatment I and uncertainty-seeking attitude were dropped
from the probit regression, in order to avoid the problem of collinearity. Dummies for degree/subject
studied at university of subjects, age and gender were found to be insignicant and were thus dropped
14The question posed to the subjects was: "An urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are labelled X. The remainder
are labelled either Y or Z. Which of the following options do you prefer? A payo¤ of 100 if a ball labelled X is drawn
or a payo¤ of 100 if a ball labelled Y is drawn." Subjects who are uncertainty-averse should choose to bet on balls
labelled X, as their quantity is known. Subjects who are not uncertainty-averse would be expected to choose to bet
on balls labelled Y , whose quantity is unknown.
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from the nal regression.15 The nal regression has a chi-square ratio of 36:55 with a p-value of 0:0000;
which indicates that the model as a whole is statistically signicant.
Table 5: Probit Regression Results
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Err. z P > jzj [95% Conf. Interval]
Treatment II :3794556 :1412632 2:69 0:007 :1025848 :6563264
Treatment III :4310939 :1526451 2:82 0:005 :1319151 :7302728
Treatment IV  :2192589 :1330922  1:65 0:099  :4801149 :0415971
Uncertainty Averse :2946323 :1113287 2:65 0:008 :076432 :5128325
Constant :2259345 :1239068 1:82 0:068  :0169183 :4687873
*, **, *** indicate signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
The coe¢ cients from a probit regression do not have the same interpretation as coe¢ cients from
an Ordinary Least Squares regression. From Table 5, we can interpret that in Treatment II the
z-score increases by 0:38; making it more likely for the insurance to be bought than in the base
treatment. Similarly in Treatment III, the z-score increases by 0:43; but in Treatment IV the z-score
decreases by 0:219; compared to the base treatment. Treatment IV was only signicant at 10% while
Treatments II and III were signicant at 1%.
It can be concluded that Treatments II and III provide situations where the insurance is more
likely to be purchased, while Treatment IV hampers contributions. Moreover if a subject is uncertainty-
averse in the classic Ellsberg urn situation, the z-score increases by 0:29, making it signicantly more
likely for the insurance to be purchased than the reference group (uncertainty-seeking people). This is
in line with the hypothesis that uncertainty-aversion would make individuals more likely to contribute
towards a climate change insurance.
6 Conclusion
Overall, subjectsbehaviour was consistent with Nash equilibrium, however, a sizable minority of
subjects did display behaviour consistent with an uncertainty-averse attitude. It is important to
15This information is collected as standard practice for all subjects who take part in experiments at FEELE.
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note that it is easier to coordinate on the Nash equilibrium, when the group consists of two people.
Increasing the group size beyond two, might result in an increase in coordination failures and/or
increase in contributions fuelled by uncertainty-averse behaviour (since strategic uncertainty can be
seen to increase with group-size).
A majority of subjects do reach the threshold required to insure themselves against the climate
change catastrophe. This indicates that individuals are concerned about climate change and the
resultant impact it may have on our every day lives. As such, there may be scope for insurance
companies to o¤er insurances tailored specically to cover climate-change related catastrophes, with
premiums that reect the low frequency/high-impact nature of climate events, which have a long tail
in terms of liabilities.
An insurance of this type would require a widespread up-take, in order to su¢ ciently cross-
insure risks across geographical regions and make it feasible from the insurance companiespoint of
view. Increasing the availability of information about the frequency of climate change catastrophes
in the past (Treatment II), leads to a signicant increase in insurance subscriptions amongst those
individuals who perceive themselves to be at a high-risk of becoming victims. Unless individuals
perceived to live in "high-risk" areas, are cross-insured by individuals living in "low-risk" areas,
insurance companies would nd that all their customers were lemons and would quickly go out of
business. Government intervention may thus be required in order to improve the market outcome in
the presence of asymmetric subscriptions.
Treatment III nds that removing the strategic uncertainty of contribution towards the insurance
results in a signicant increase in insurance subscriptions. Interestingly, an indirect policy interven-
tion in the form of a "nudge" does not have the intended e¤ects. The nudge was in fact found to
be counter-productive and may have resulted in a fall in subscriptions. In terms of e¢ ciency, again,
removing the strategic uncertainty of otherscontributions (Treatment III) provides the best results,
while the indirect policy intervention was least e¢ cient.
In future investigations, it might be interesting to ascertain whether subjects who failed to reach
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the threshold and lost their endowment as a result of the catastrophe "occurring", behave di¤erently
if they are asked to play the game again. This would be an extension of Treatment II, since subjects
will have experienced rst-hand the damage caused by failing to secure the threshold. In reality,
insurance premiums would increase to reect the growing frequency of the catastrophe. It would be
interesting to see whether subjects are willing to pay more to buy an insurance, which they had failed
to purchase previously at a lower price. The key idea here is to investigate whether experiencing a
low-probability high-impact event can change the uncertainty-attitude of a subject.
Climate change and its allied e¤ects are becoming inevitable, and as such, greater measures need
to be put in place to safeguard individualsinterests. In this study, indirect state interventions or
nudges, were found to be ine¤ective in the climate change context. Further investigations may be
required to ascertain more direct mechanisms that would ensure a better outcome.
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